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House prices plummet in Sydney: the financialisation of housing comes unstuck
House prices plummet in Sydney: 
the financialisation of housing comes unstuck
 By Alan Morris
1. Introduction
In the decade to June 2017, Sydney (Australia’s 
largest city, population about 5 million) was 
caught up in a massive escalation of residential 
property prices; house prices grew by 76.5% 
in real terms and nominal growth was 111% 
(Kusher, 2017). The median price of houses in 
Sydney in June 2017 was $1,178,417, and of 
apartments, $757,991 (Domain, 2017), mak-
ing Sydney the second most expensive city 
globally after Hong Kong. In 2012, there were 
159 Sydney suburbs with a median price under 
$500,000, by October 2017, there were none 
(Duke, 2017). Almost all of Sydney’s suburbs 
had a median house price of more than a mil-
lion dollars and in August 2015, the number of 
Sydney suburbs with a median house price of 
more than $2 million had doubled in the space 
of a year. At this time, 40 of the 48 suburbs in 
Australia with a median price above $2 million 
were in Sydney (Schlesinger, 2015). There 
existed what was described as ‘a frenzied 
property market’ (Bouris, 2017) characterised 
by a great fear of not being in the market. An 
acronym to capture this sentiment emerged, 
FOMO, ‘fear of missing out’. 
In mid-2017, the seemingly never-ending surge 
in the residential property market in Sydney (and 
Melbourne) came to an abrupt end. By March 
2019, Sydney house prices had fallen by 16% 
in real terms from their peak in mid-2017 (in 
Janda, 2019) and in April 2019, a report by 
the rating agency, Moody’s, concluded that in 
the next 12 months prices in parts of Sydney 
could fall another 15% (in Wright, 2019a). The 
median house price in Sydney in March 2019 was 
$1,027,962, a drop of $170,000 from the peak 
in mid-2017 (Burke, 2019), and the decline has 
been greater than the decline experienced in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
Purchases of investment properties have fallen 
sharply – loans to investors have dropped by 
about 50% over the last three years (Scutt, 
2019). The number of new listing (residential 
properties for sale) in April 2019 was down 
29% on April 2018, probably reflecting a lack 
of confidence by potential sellers - households 
are not selling unless they have to. The number 
of house sales has collapsed to their lowest 
level since the early 1990s (Wright and Yeates, 
2019). In February 2019, the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics estimated that the total value of new 
lending to Australian households had declined 
by 19.8% (Collet, 2019). The slump is affect-
ing all sections of Sydney’s housing market 
and appears to be deepening. In Mosman, one 
of Sydney’s wealthiest suburbs, by May 2019 
there had not been one sale in the $10 million 
plus bracket, whereas in the first five months 
of 2018, there had been eight $10 million plus 
sales (Burke and Macken, 2019).
The article sets out to explain the dramatic 
turnaround in the residential property market 
in Sydney. The primary argument is that the 
decline is linked to a serious disruption of the 
intense financialisation of housing that charac-
terised Sydney’s housing market over the last 
decade. The disruption was mainly due to an 
increasing fear by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
[RBA] and the regulators of the financial services 
industry, the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority [APRA]1 and the Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission [ASIC],2 that the 
price increases were creating an environment 
fraught with risk. 
The article first briefly outlines the features 
of the financialisation of housing in Sydney. It 
then examines the reasons for the financialisa-
tion of housing creating the ‘seeds of its own 
destruction’.
2.  The financialisation of
housing in Sydney
A key feature of the financialisation of hous-
ing, is that housing is increasingly viewed as a 
means of accumulation (Aalbers, 2016; Madden 
& Marcuse, 2016). The massive increase in 
house prices in Sydney in the 2012 to 2017 
period, was premised on the pervasive expec-
tation that house prices in Sydney could only 
increase and that if a household had the capac-
ity to invest in Sydney’s property market, not to 
do so would be foolhardy. Residential property, 
in line with the financialisation of housing thesis, 
was viewed as an obvious and safe site for 
investment. The intense desire to invest in 
residential property was given much impetus 
by an extremely generous tax regime for local 
property investors. ‘Negative gearing’ allows 
investors to deduct losses related to their invest-
ment property from their taxable income. Thus, 
if an investor’s mortgage is $30,000 a year and 
the rent is $1,500 a month ($18,000 a year) and 
the landlord’s expenses are $3,000, they can 
deduct $15,000 from their overall income for 
tax purposes ($30,000 - $18,000 plus $3,000). 
Also, the generous capital gains tax means that 
when the property is sold, it must be owned for 
at least 12 months, only 50% of the capital gain 
is taxed. By 2016, 27% of residential proper-
ties in Australia were owned by investors and 
investors accounted for 47% of the value of 
‘new mortgage originations’ (Corelogic, 2016: 
4). Sydney and Melbourne, Australia’s two big-
gest cities, dominated the residential property 
investment market. 
Besides local investors, foreign investors also 
saw Sydney’s residential property as a safe 
haven. The period 2009 to 2017 was witness 
to a dramatic increase in foreign investment in 
1   APRA’s role is to develop and enforce ‘a robust prudential framework of legislation, prudential 
standards and prudential guidance’ so as to ensure that deposit-taking institutions, insurance 
companies, superannuation funds behave in a prudent fashion and thereby protect the interests 
of their depositors or clients. 
2   ASIC’s role is to ensure that the financial system operates in a fair and transparent and efficient 
manner by the regulating conduct of companies in the financial sector and financial advisers. 
APRA and ASIC are in regular contact and often collaborate.
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residential property – increasing from $8.77 
billion in 2009-10 (Australian Government, 2011) 
to $34,7 billion in 2013-2014, to $60.8 billion in 
2014-2015 and reaching a high point of $72.4 
billion in 2015-2016 (Australian Government, 
2018). This was despite legislation that confines 
foreign investment in residential property to new 
properties only. The increase was driven mainly 
by Chinese investors entering the Australian 
residential market as individual investors and 
as developers. Over the last few years, Chinese, 
Hong Kong and Singaporean investors have 
accounted for about a third of all foreign invest-
ment in Australian real estate (Fickling, 2019a)
 
Financial institutions also played a central role 
in facilitating the housing boom in Sydney. 
Investors in residential property could obtain 
loans with relative ease. In April 2017, Australia-
wide, interest-only loans accounted for 64% 
of investor and 23% of owner-occupier loans 
(RBA, 2017). The ability of borrowers to service 
the loan was often assessed using a calcula-
tion method that overstated the capacity of 
the borrower. Around 40% of all loans were 
assessed ‘on lower hypothetical P&I [payment 
and interest] repayments calculated from the 
entire term of IO [interest only] loans (including 
the IO period; known as the full-term method)’ 
(RBA, 2017). The Reserve Bank concluded 
that this method of calculating repayments ‘is 
potentially in breach of the National Consumer 
Credit Protection Act 2009, which requires that 
lenders make loans that consumers will be able 
to repay without undue hardship’ (RBA, 2017). 
3.  Explaining the fall in house 
prices 
The crucial factor contributing to the decline 
has been the tightening of credit and a shift in 
the perception that house prices in Sydney can 
only increase. These changes have resulted in 
a substantial drop in the number of investors 
and ultimately a drop in demand and prices. 
The local dynamics have been compounded by 
a dramatic drop in foreign investors. In sum, the 
financialisation of housing created a situation 
which was viewed as increasingly dangerous 
for the economy and had to be reined in. 
3.1. The tightening up of credit 
The housing bubble in Sydney and Melbourne 
precipitated by the financialisation of hous-
ing, was viewed with increasing concern by 
the Reserve Bank of Australia [RBA]. By 2017, 
there was a strong view that the astronomi-
cal increase in house prices in Sydney and 
Melbourne had to be reined in. The minutes 
of the monthly monetary policy meeting of the 
RBA board at the height of the housing bubble 
in Sydney in April 2017 (house prices in Sydney 
had increased 18% in the previous year) are 
illuminating. They capture the RBA’s growing 
unease with the runaway housing market. There 
was concern that a proportion of households 
could find themselves struggling to retain 
their homes, especially if there was a drop in 
a household’s income for whatever reason, and 
or an interest rate hike:
Members noted … that some households with 
home loans appeared to have little or no buffer 
of excess mortgage repayments and could be 
vulnerable if household income were lower than 
expected. This observation emphasised the 
importance of realistic assessments of house-
hold expenses and prudent lending standards 
for mitigating risks to both financial stability 
and macroeconomic outcomes (RBA, 2017). 
The minutes expressed concern that high-risk 
interest-only loans were continuing to increase. 
The increase had taken place despite regula-
tions put in place by the financial regulators, 
APRA and ASIC in 2014 to slow down the grant-
ing of interest-only loans (RBA, 2017). 
APRA’s guidance had included limits on the 
share of interest-only loans in new housing 
loans and a requirement that banks impose 
strict limits on new interest-only lending at high 
loan-to-valuation ratios. Members recognised 
that the calibration of this guidance was not pre-
cise or straightforward. Developments needed 
to be kept under review and, depending on how 
the system responds to the various measures, 
members noted that the Council of Financial 
Regulators would consider further measures 
if needed (RBA, 2017).
In March 2017, APRA announced that financial 
institutions needed to restrict interest-only 
loans to a maximum of 30% of all new resi-
dential property loans (APRA, 2017). In a letter 
addressed to all ‘deposit taking institutions’, it 
justified its decision by highlighting ‘the height-
ened risk that has prevailed for the past few 
years’. The letter went on to state, 
 the environment remains one of high housing 
prices, high and rising household indebtedness, 
subdued household income growth, historically 
low interest rates and strong competitive pres-
sures … Against this background, APRA views 
a higher proportion of interest-only lending in 
the current environment to be indicative of a 
higher risk profile (APRA, 2017). 
APRA’s decision was made in a context of 
increasing concern about financial institu-
tions making risky loans and operating in a 
high-handed fashion. The behaviour of the 
financial sector led to an increasingly strong 
call for a Royal Commission into the behaviour 
of these institutions. The calls were dismissed 
by the conservative Coalition government 
(elected in 2013) on the basis that it would 
weaken Australia’s super profitable and highly 
monopolised financial sector. In an opinion piece 
in 2016, Kelly O’Dwyer, the then Minister for 
Revenue and Financial Services, wrote,
For the Labor Party to propose a Royal 
Commission into banks is reckless and ill-
conceived. Critically, a Royal Commission 
would go over old ground and would delay well-
developed and important reforms, such as lifting 
the professional standards for advisers. A Royal 
Commission would send the signal internationally 
that the government believes there are structural 
problems with our banking and financial system 
and could lead to significant repercussions for 
confidence, international investment, and our 
AAA credit rating (O’Dwyer, 2016). 
Despite intense resistance from the conserva-
tive side of politics, further scandals meant that 
the government was forced to establish a Royal 
Commission into Misconduct into the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 
in December 2017. 
Besides the directive from APRA, the dev-
astating evidence of victims of poor banking 
practices at the Royal Commission, was a 
key reason for the tightening of credit by the 
banks. The Commission received 10,323 sub-
missions from the public. A prime focus of the 
Commission was irresponsible lending and the 
final report was highly critical of the financial 
sector concluding ‘… conduct by many entities 
that has taken place over many years … [has 
caused] substantial loss to many customers 
but yielding substantial profit to the entities 
concerned’ (Hayne, 2019: 1). The final report 
went on to state, 
Rewarding misconduct is wrong. Yet incentive, 
bonus and commission schemes throughout 
the financial services industry have measured 
sales and profit, but not compliance with the 
law and proper standards. Incentives have been 
offered, and rewards have been paid, regardless 
of whether the sale was made, or profit derived, 
in accordance with law. Rewards have been 
paid regardless of whether the person rewarded 
should have done what they did (Hayne, 2019: 2, 
italics in original). 
Another area of major concern to the Royal 
Commission was the role of ‘mortgage bro-
kers’. Mortgage brokers recruit borrowers for 
home loans and receive a commission from the 
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financial institution they link the borrower to. 
The Commission found that because mortgage 
brokers were dependent on obtaining a com-
mission from the financial institution concerned, 
there was a strong incentive to give misleading 
information to the financial institution in respect 
of the borrower’s borrowing capacity. 
If, in practice, brokers were to act in the best 
interests of borrowers, there would be fewer 
cases where brokers act in ways that see lend-
ers given wrong or incomplete information about 
the financial situation of loan applicants (Hayne, 
2019: 72). 
Although the financial institutions and mortgage 
brokers bore most of the criticism, APRA, the 
financial services regulator, was also heavily 
criticised by the Commission for its weak regula-
tion and failure to deal with serious breaches. 
Following the Royal Commission, APRA 
instructed the banks to tighten up on lending. 
ASIC, whose role is to ensure that corporations 
behave ethically, announced that it will embed 
supervisors within the big four banks. The deputy 
chairperson of ASIC commented that the Royal 
Commission signified a ‘societal shift” in public 
expectations of corporations and had granted 
ASIC the capacity to apply tougher penalties 
if rules around responsible lending laws are 
breached. He warned that ‘We will … need 
to apply them because otherwise they are an 
abstract concept’. Another deputy chairperson 
of ASIC referred to the need to cut out what she 
described as ‘toxic revenue’ (in Yeates, 2019). 
The mauling the banks received at the Royal 
Commission meant that they were willing to com-
ply with the stricter regulations around lending. 
In 2018, the number of loans taken out to buy 
a new home or apartment dropped nationally 
by 18.7% and total loans in New South Wales 
dropped by 11.3% (Wright, 2019b). The director 
of a leading mortgage broker claimed in July 2018 
that, ‘Up to 20% of people who took a loan out 
two or three years ago would not qualify for that 
loan today. In the last six months lenders have 
had this lightbulb moment of what ‘responsible 
lending means’ (in Pedersen-McKinnon, 2018). 
Loan approval times lengthened as lenders 
spent a lot more time ascertaining whether the 
borrower had the requisite household income to 
pay back the loan. The principal economist of 
the Housing Industry Association [HIA], the peak 
body representing developers, complained that 
the tightening up of loan requirements was hav-
ing an adverse impact on the housing market: 
In [the context] of the more restrictive lending 
environment homebuyers now face, it is clear that 
the soft lending numbers are as much to do with 
would-be home buyers having greater difficulty 
accessing finance as it is about sentiment. At this 
juncture it will be important for the regulators to 
monitor the impact of their earlier interventions to 
ensure that policy settings remain appropriate in 
the new phase of the cycle (HIA, 2018).
Noteworthy is that in December 2018, the APRA 
announced that from the beginning of 2019, the 
restrictions on interest-only loans will be lifted. 
The announcement was justified by the claim 
that APRA’s actions have resulted in financial 
institutions significantly improving their lend-
ing standards and reducing higher risk lending 
(APRA, 2018). It would appear that the main 
motivation for the decision was to stem the 
substantial drop in residential property prices 
in Sydney and Melbourne (Hutchens, 2019). 
3.2.  The drop off of local and foreign 
investors 
The tightening up of bank lending and the 
increased scrutiny of credit worthiness of poten-
tial borrowers has had an impact on demand 
despite record low interest rates. Since peaking 
in 2017, investor loans have fallen by 45% in 
value (Scutt, 2019). Besides the tightening of 
credit, investors are now wary of entering the 
Sydney property market amidst much talk that 
it could fall further. 
Local investors had also been discouraged by 
the proposed policy of the opposition Labor 
Party to restrict negative gearing to new proper-
ties only and revamping the capital gains tax by 
reducing the 50% discount to 25% if it had won 
government in May 2019. These policies would 
have been ‘grandfathered’ so they would have 
only applied to properties acquired after the 1 
January 2020. The shadow treasurer justified 
the policy, by referring to the role negative gear-
ing and the generous capital gains tax have 
played in the financialistion of housing: 
Labor wants to create the conditions that 
promote home ownership, not a system which 
promotes a nation of property oligarchs and 
renters. The stronger growth for investors 
accumulating multiple investment properties 
is just another indication of the ‘excesses’ in 
negative gearing … (in Wright, 2019c). 
There is a possibility that the failure of the Labor 
Party to win back government, could result in 
investors returning to the market in large num-
bers. Potential investors will be aware that the 
possibility of negative gearing being restricted 
or a less generous capital gains tax ever being 
put in place, is now remote. 
As illustrated, in the last decade there was a 
phenomenal increase in foreign investment in 
residential property. However, the reversal of 
foreign investment has been as dramatic as the 
rise. Foreign investment in residential property in 
Australia fell from a high of $72.4 billion in 2015-
2016, to $30 billion in 2016-17 to $12.5 billion 
in 2017-2018 (Australian Government, 2019). 
The number of residential real estate approvals 
dropped from 40,169 in 2015-2016 to 13,198 
in 2016-2017 (Australian Government, 2018). 
A key contributor to the decline has been the 
crackdown by the Chinese government on 
capital outflows. Chinese citizens can send 
out a maximum of $US50,000 a year, and the 
monitoring of endeavours to circumvent this 
limit has increased significantly (Smith, 2018). 
A senior researcher with the Bank of China 
commented, ‘The overseas property invest-
ment will be more rational in the future. There 
could be an impact on the Australian property 
market due to shrinking demand from China’ 
(in Smith, 2018). Overall Chinese investment in 
Australia declined from a high of $47.3 billion in 
2015-16, to $23.7 billion in 2017-18 (Australian 
Government, 2019). 
Noteworthy is that Ausin, a real estate com-
pany based in Shanghai and used by Chinese 
investors to purchase properties in Australia, 
went into liquidation in August 2018, result-
ing in around 130 failed residential property 
settlements in Australia, mainly in Sydney 
(Tan, 2018). Chinese investors paid Ausin in 
yuan for Australian properties and the com-
pany would then circumvent China’s foreign 
exchange restrictions and purchase residential 
property in Australia. In a further blow to the 
Australian residential property market, at the 
beginning of 2019 it was reported that there 
had been a major assault on ‘underground 
banks’ that have been used to take money out 
of China for property purchases. Operators of 
underground banks face jail terms of up to five 
years and massive fines (Smith and Tan, 2019). 
Historically, underground banks have played a 
central role in channelling billions of dollars out 
of China for investment. Despite the substantial 
reduction in Chinese investment in residential 
property, China remained the largest source of 
foreign investment for residential real estate 
(Australian Government, 2018). 
In Australia, legislation was put in place that 
also appeared to have had an impact on foreign 
investment in residential property. In December 
2015, an application fee was introduced for 
foreign investors. In May 2017, an annual 
vacancy charge was introduced for properties 
bought by foreign investors and left vacant for 
more than six months in a 12 month period. 
Also, a 50% cap on pre-approvals of foreign 
ownership in new developments was put in 
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place in 2017 (Australian Government, 2018). 
Finally, there has also been a tightening up of 
compliance in relation to the foreign investment 
regulatory framework. In 2015, the manage-
ment of the compliance regime was taken over 
by the Australian Tax Office [ATO]. The ATO 
employed 57 people whose sole activity is to 
scrutinise residential property investments 
by foreign investors (Australian Government, 
2018). In 2015-2016, the ATO identified 260 
breaches of the framework and in 2016-2017, 
549 (Australian Government, 2018). 
3.3. Weak demand 
In March 2019, it was reported that 8,000 
homes in Sydney had been on the market for 
at least a year (Wright & Bagshaw, 2019). A 
combination of factors has contributed to the 
substantial fall-off in local and foreign demand 
for residential property in Sydney. The realisa-
tion that capital growth was definitely no longer 
a given was clearly the key factor weakening 
demand. Now that capital growth is no longer 
certain, the low rent yield has come into play. 
Prior to the downturn, investors in Sydney were 
not overly concerned with the state of the rental 
market, the focus was on capital gains. Now that 
prices are falling, rental yield has become far 
more pertinent. In February 2018, rental yields 
were 3.57%, the lowest in 12 years, and there 
is little inducement for investors to purchase 
on the basis that the property will yield a good 
rental income (Burke, 2018). 
This has all come about in a context of a 
large increase in supply. In 2018, 28,000 new 
apartments came onto the market and another 
26,300 will be completed in 2019. (Fickling, 
2019b). Developers are finding it difficult to sell 
newly completed apartments. Symbolic of the 
difficulty, at the beginning of 2019 receivers 
were instructed by a bank based in China to sell 
61 apartments in one line in a newly completed, 
multi-storey apartment block. The developer 
managed to sell 69 of the 130 apartments, but 
could not dispose of the remaining 61 (Johanson 
and Cummins, 2019). The acronym FONGO, fear 
of not getting out, has emerged to capture a 
growing anxiety amongst investors, especially 
those who bought at the height of the boom 
(Yeates, 2018). 
Although, Sydney house prices have dropped 
substantially, prices are still extremely high 
relative to household income. For a large 
proportion of first time home-buyers, it is 
still exceptionally difficult if not impossible to 
raise the deposit for a home in Sydney without 
financial assistance from family. A major factor 
is low wage growth. For the last seven years, 
wage growth has barely outstripped inflation. 
Thus, whereas wage growth in the 2007 to 2012 
period was about 3.6%, in the period 2012 to 
2017 it was about 2.2%. Real wage growth 
has averaged about 0.4% in the 2012 to 2017 
period, whereas it was about 1% in the decade 
previously (Australian Government, 2017). In the 
five-year period, 2012 to 2017, house prices 
in Sydney almost doubled, effectively locking 
many young people out of the housing market. 
In Sydney, the home ownership rate for persons 
aged 18 to 39 plummeted from 29.2% in 2002 
to 19.7% in 2014 (Wilkins, 2017). 
In addition, although the official unemployment 
rate is low, around 5%, the rate of under-
employment is high. Since the global financial 
crisis under-employment has increased from 
6% to 8.3% in September 2018 (ABS, 2018). 
To save for a deposit for a home in Sydney, it is 
essential that at least one member of the house-
hold is employed full-time. The weakening of the 
financialisation of housing has certainly made 
it easier for first-time homebuyers in Sydney to 
enter the market. A recent first home buyers 
report concluded,
First-home buyers [in Sydney] are operating in 
a market that has less urgency to purchase – 
there are fewer investors to compete against, 
foreign buyer interest has declined, prices are 
still falling and there are a wider choice of 
homes on the market. Purchasing conditions 
have inevitability improved (Powell, 2019). 
 
However, for many, the Sydney property market 
remains elusive. Thus, nation-wide (Sydney 
specific data was not available), despite the 
drop in prices, in December 2019, new lending 
to owner occupiers fell 6.4%, outpacing the 
4.6% drop in loans to investors (Collett, 2019). 
In 2018, new lending to households dropped 
19.8% (Collett, 2019). In September 2017, the 
Housing Industry Association’s housing afford-
ability index reported that in Sydney it takes 
more than two average full-time salaries to ser-
vice a mortgage for an average home (in Wade, 
2017). Although prices have declined, they have 
dropped from an extremely high level, and it 
likely that for many Sydney households, entering 
the housing market remains an impossibility. 
4. Conclusion
The decline in house prices in Sydney from 
mid-2017 ended what was an intense hous-
ing bubble premised on the financialisation 
of housing. The mad scramble by local and 
foreign investors for Sydney residential property, 
ensured a massive escalation in Sydney house 
prices. The scramble was greatly facilitated 
and encouraged by easy access to credit in a 
context of low interest rates and an extremely 
generous tax regime for investors. The end 
of the boom was primarily precipitated by the 
RBA, the financial regulators and the general 
public in the wake of the Royal Commission 
into the financial sector. They put pressure on 
lenders to be more stringent. The more stringent 
lending regime coincided with a dramatic drop 
in Chinese investors. The latter added to the 
perception that the Sydney housing market was 
no longer a foolproof investment. 
It is unclear what the future holds for Sydney’s 
residential property market. Although prices have 
come down substantially, house prices are still 
extremely high relative to income. The re-election 
of a Conservative government in the federal elec-
tion in May 2019, means that negative gearing 
and a generous capital gains tax are no longer 
under threat. Also, there will probably be a further 
loosening of regulations around lending, and a 
lowering of interest rates by the Reserve Bank 
is now viewed as inevitable (Wright, 2019d). 
In combination, these factors could result in 
a rekindling of investor interest in the Sydney 
residential market and the associated negative 
features – speculation and absurd price rises. 
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